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ABSTRACT 
 
On November 22, 2005, the Manager of the Plutonium 
Finishing Plant (PFP) in Richland, WA issued an 
Occurrence Report involving a potential Pu-Fe eutectic 
failure mechanism for the stainless steel (SS) 3013 cans 
containing plutonium (Pu) metal. Four additional reports 
addressed nuclear safety concerns about the integrity of 
stainless steel containers holding plutonium during fire 
scenarios. The reports expressed a belief that the probability 
and consequences of container failure due to the formation 
of a plutonium-iron eutectic alloy had been overlooked. 
Simplified thermal model to address the Pu-Fe eutectic 
concerns using axisymmetric model similar to the models 
used in the 9975 SARP were performed. The model uses 
Rocky Flats configuration with 2 stacked Pu buttons inside a 
3013 assembly. The assembly has an outer can, an inner can, 
and a convenience can, all stainless steel. The boundary 
conditions are similar to the regulatory 30 minutes HAC fire 
analyses. Computer simulations of the HAC fire transients 
lasting 4 hours of burn time show that the interface between 
the primary containment vessel and the Pu metal in the 9975 
package will not reach Pu-Fe eutectic temperature of 400°C. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Four recent ORPS reports (Ref. 1-4) addressed nuclear 
safety concerns about the integrity of stainless steel 
containers holding plutonium during fire scenarios. The 
reports expressed a belief that the probability and 
consequences of container failure due to the formation of a 
plutonium-iron eutectic alloy had been overlooked.  As 
expressed in the two LANL ORPS reports (Ref. 3 and 4):   
 
“ Historic metallurgy work has identified a eutectic effect 
(an alloy whose melting point is lower than that of any 
other alloy composed of the same constituents in different 
proportions) created when plutonium metal is heated in 
the presence of various other metals including iron. If 
plutonium metal and steel are heated to a sufficient 
temperature, but lower than the melting point of plutonium 
metal or steel, the plutonium reacts with the iron in the steel 
creating an alloy with a lower melting point than plutonium 
metal or steel. If enough alloy is generated it can cause the 
failure of the steel. Acceptable storage containers for 
plutonium metal include containers made of stainless steel. 
If the stainless steel containers were stored in areas whose 
maximum fire temperature exceeded the eutectic 
temperature of plutonium metal and steel, the containers 
might fail.” 
 
The statement above assumes that during fire scenarios, a 
plutonium-iron (Pu-Fe) eutectic alloy will form and then fail a 
stainless steel container by melting or other mechanisms.  The 
phase diagram in Figure 1 shows eutectic melting points of 
plutonium-iron alloys.  Of chief concern is the eutectic 
melting point for 90% plutonium and 10% iron, at 410°C.  
Plutonium with 1% gallium forms a eutectic with iron that 
melts at 400°C.  Pure plutonium melts at approximately 
640°C.          
 
The temperatures from hypothetical fire scenarios can 
reach 800°C in a half hour (e.g., following the ASTM E-119 
time-temperature fire curve), far above both the eutectic 
melting point and the melting point of pure plutonium.  
However, plutonium containers are usually stored within 
transportation packages (e.g., 9975 packages or 6M drums) 
with some thermal protection, so the main concerns of the 
ORPS reports were cases in which containers were out of 
transportation packages (e.g. for inspection) or accident 
scenarios where the transportation packages become damaged.        
 
A key question is: Under what conditions will plutonium 
and the iron in stainless steel form a eutectic?  Metallurgical 
interactions were considered in DOE-STD-3013-2004, but 
mainly for storage conditions.  That standard concluded that 
plutonium can be stored in stainless steel up to 250°C for 10 
years or more without significant eutectic formation.  
However, currently there seems to be no clear consensus on 
whether the plutonium-iron eutectic will form significantly at 
the eutectic temperature (400-410°C), near the melting point 
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of pure plutonium (above 600°C), or at some higher 
temperature.   
 
Pu metal and Pu bearing materials are stored at 
Savannah River Site (SRS).  The main configurations are 
9975 packages and 3013 vessels stored on metal racks.  
Since SRS has performed thermal analyses for the 9975 
package containing 3013 assemblies, the Argonne National 
Laboratory (ANL), managing the Pu-Eutectic issue, 
requested the SRS to perform thermal analyses involving 
facility fires up to 4 hours long and their impact on the Pu 
container temperatures.  3013 cans stored on metal racks are 
directly impacted by any room fire.  However, the 9975 
package contain substantial fiberboard insulating material 
(Celotex) to protect the 3013 Pu containers from fires.   
 
COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 
 
Mathematical Model 
The heat transfer governing equations for unsteady state 
system in axisymmetric cylindrical coordinates (r,z) are: 
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Where '''q  is the volumetric heat generation by the fissile 
material per unit time, T is the temperature and k1 and k2 are 
the thermal conductivities of different materials in the radial 
(r) and axial (z) directions respectively.  In general, k1 and k2 
are functions of r, z, and T.  r is the density and Cp is the 
specific heat of various materials.  r is constant and Cp 
could vary with temperature for certain materials. 
 
The boundary conditions are: 
 
● Heat transfer coefficient (h) at the drum outer surface, 
● Emissivity (e) at the drum outer and inner surfaces and 
at other radiating surfaces inside the package, and 
● Ambient temperature Ta = 1475°F.   
 
The partial differential equation (1) is non-linear and is 
solved by numerical methods using MSC PATRAN Thermal 
solver [6]. 
 
Geometry and Contents 
The 3013 assembly consists of a site specific stainless 
steel can which is stored inside a welded 3013 inner can.  
The inner can is in turn stored inside a welded 3013 outer 
can.  The site specific can contains the payload of Pu metal 
with a maximum of 19 watts.  The Pu buttons are in direct 
contact with the can metal surfaces forming a potential 
Pu/Fe eutectic interface.  Rocky Flats configuration contains 
two Pu buttons that could be stacked in one can or the 
buttons could be stored in separate cans.  The configuration 
with the stacked buttons will yield higher local temperatures 
and, therefore, this is the configuration that is analyzed in this 
paper.  This configuration was analyzed in the certification of 
9975 package and the supporting thermal analyses are 
documented in Reference 6.  The 3013 dimensions are taken 
from the Rocky Flats configuration in Reference 6 and are 
also used in the 3013 assembly model on the metal rack.     
 
Material Properties 
The thermal properties are identical to the 9975 package 
30 minutes HAC fire analyses [6].  The fiberboard properties 
for the 30 minutes burn duration are derived from 
benchmarking performed for the 9975 package.  Since charred 
fiberboard is removed for each successive 30 minutes burn 
(discussed below), charred properties that were used for the 
post fire analyses of the 9975, are not used here in this 
investigation.  Different materials inside the 9975 package and 
inside the 3013 assembly are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Thermal Models 
Two thermal models are prepared to analyze the 3013 
storage configurations.  In the first model the 3013 assembly is 
stored on a metal rack and is exposed to the fire conditions 
directly.  The second model is the 9975 configuration with 
Rocky Flats configuration.  In the 9975 configuration, there is 
good amount of insulation between the fire and the 3013 
assembly.  As mentioned earlier, since the fire test data for the 
9975 storage configuration were benchmarked for 30 minutes 
fires only, an HAC model for the 9975 package could not be 
used for 4 hour burn.  In the absence of real test data for the 
fiberboard for such a long burn time, a reasonable simple 
thermal model was agreed upon with the Argonne National 
Laboratory (ANL) in which charred Celotex (≥500ºF) will be 
removed for each subsequent 30 minute transient run.  
Therefore, 7 thermal models with Rocky Flats configuration 
each containing 2 stacked Pu buttons were developed to study 
60 minutes to 240 minutes long fires.  Only one model was 
required to analyze the 3013 assembly on the metal rack. 
 
During HAC testing of 9975, a 30 minutes fire test 
showed that up to 2 cm (0.8 inches) of fiberboard was lost at 
some locations around the drum periphery and an average of 
1.4 inches of fiberboard was found to be charred.  The fire 
tests showed that fiberboard did not ablate but left behind ash 
that acts as good insulator for the ensuing fire.  For this 
evaluation, the fiberboard layer experiencing a temperature of 
about 500ºF is considered ash and is removed (conservative 
approximation) for each subsequent 30 minutes burn step.  
Therefore, the 30 minutes FE model from 30 minutes to 60 
minutes step was modified where 1.4 inches of fiberboard was 
removed for the 30 minutes burn.  Figure 3 shows the color 
representation of a model for a burn period from 30 minutes to 
60 minutes.  After each 30 minutes run, temperature profiles 
were determined.  The fiberboard material that experienced 
temperatures from 450ºF to 500ºF was replaced with air for 
the next 30 minutes burn.  Radiation heat transfer is 
maintained between the drum and the unburned fiberboard for 
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each 30 minutes burn.  The emissivities of the inner surface 
of the drum and the charred Celotex surface are set to 0.9 to 
maximize radiant heat exchange between the drum and the 
unburned Celotex.  In addition, no credit is taken for the heat 
lost in the gases escaping through the vent plugs. 
 
For the first 30 minutes of the fire transient, no air gap 
exists between the drum inner surface and the fiberboard 
and, therefore, radiation is ignored between the two surfaces.  
For the subsequent 30 minute steps, radiation is considered 
between the drum and the unburned fiberboard surface.   
 
RESULTS 
 
3013 on Metal Rack 
Figure 6 shows the temperature contours for the Pu buttons 
in the 3013 assembly stored on a metal rack for the first 10 
minutes.  It is found that the Pu-Fe interface reaches well above 
Pu-Fe eutectic temperature of 752ºF (400ºC) in less than 10 
minutes. 
 
3013 in 9975 Packaging 
The temperature contours for the whole model for 
multiple 30 minutes burn steps are shown in Figure 7.  The 
temperature scale range in Figure 7 is from 150ºF to 1475ºF.  
The temperature contours for the Pu buttons are shown in 
Figure 8.  The temperature scale range in Figure 8 is from 
150ºF to 400ºF.  These results are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  9975 Pu Can Interface Temperatures (ºF) During 
the Fire Transient 
Burn Time 
(Minutes) 
Pu/SS Interface 
Temperature (ºF) 
30 323 
60 325 
90 329 
120 333 
150 339 
180 347 
210 357 
240 368 
 
 
The multiple 30 minutes fire burn simulations show that 
the Celotex burn depth decreases during successive burn 
steps.  This can be explained by the fact that the additional 
gas space provides good insulation.  The rate of radiant 
energy absorbed at the drum surface decreases in time with 
the reduction in Celotex radius and the heat up of the drum 
wall to the fire temperature.  
  
The analyses showed that the maximum Pu stainless 
steel interface temperature after 4 hours of 1475ºF (800ºC) 
fire was only 187ºC, well below the Pu-Fe eutectic 
temperature of 400ºC.  This is due to the fact that the 
additional gases occupying the removed Celotex are better 
insulators than the Celotex and help reduce the energy 
available for burning the intact Celotex.  This process is also 
helped by the reduced radiant heat available to the reduced 
size Celotex. 
 
Effect of Temperature on Eutectic Formation 
For a vulnerable region to exist, the composition in the 
region must approach the eutectic composition.  Intimate 
contact of metallic iron and plutonium, and sufficient time for 
diffusion to occur are necessary for this condition.  The 
diffusion process is strongly temperature dependent, and 
would be accelerated in the event of a fire.  For temperatures 
attained in containers stored in 9975 packagings, negligible 
diffusion would occur.  For a 3013 container stored in rack, a 
significant region of the eutectic composition could form in a 
fire lasting over an hour.  Times required for diffusion to a 
depth of 0.1 cm in a 3013 container sitting on a metal rack are 
given in Table 2 [7]. 
 
Table 2.  Time to attain Eutectic to a depth of 0.1 cm 
 
Temperature, 
ºC 
Diffusivity 
(m2/sec) 
Time  
150  10-18 Indefinite 
350 10-10 1 year 
1000 10-6 0.8 hr 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. For the bare 3013 on the metal racks, the Pu/SS304L 
interface reaches well above Pu-Fe eutectic temperature 
of 752ºF (400ºC) in less than 10 minutes in an HAC fire. 
2. For the 3013 in the 9975 package, the temperature of the 
Pu/SS304L interface will reach about 368°F (187°C) after 
4 hours of burn in an HAC fire.  This temperature is well 
below the Pu/FE eutectic temperature of 752°F (400°C). 
3.  Due to lack of Celotex test data for extended burn time (> 
30 minutes), the temperature results are approximate at 
best.  Therefore, it is recommended that additional burn 
tests should be performed to validate the results. 
However, since there is large safety margin in the 
simulation results, it is believed that Pu/SS304L interface 
temperature of 400ºC will not be reached. 
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Figure 1 – Pu Phase Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – 9975 Package Schematic 
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Figure 3 – Pu Button Geometry 
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Figure 4 – 9975 Color Representation of Material 
Locations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Color Representation of 3013 on a Metal Rack  
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 6 – Temperature Contours of 3013 Assembly 
on the Rack (10 minutes) 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – 9975 Temperature Contours for Burn Time 4 
Hours 
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Figure 8 - Temperature Contours for Pu Buttons in 9975 
at 240 Minutes (386.7ºF) 
